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Self-Deception  
 
What is Self-Deception? 
 
Lying standardly involves (at least) two people: a subject S who lies, and a target T 
who is lied to. S intends, by asserting that some belief β is true, to make T believe that β is 
true, even though S knows β to be false. Thus, one person, who knows something, sets out to 
deceive another person, who does not.  
Reasoning by analogy, self-deception would seem to involve the same person setting 
out to deceive themselves (and succeeding in doing so). But this seems impossible on the face 
of it. How can a single person play the roles of T and S, both sending and receiving a 
misleading message, both knowing that β is false and believing it is true? Much philosophical 
analysis has attempted to square this conceptual circle. Whether or not it succeeds is moot. 
Despite the paradoxical nature of self-deception, everyday examples are easily 
envisaged. A persistent hard drug user boasts he can kick his habit whenever he wants. A 
student who keeps skipping class insists she wishes to pursue an academic career. A husband 
who habitually cheats on his wife swears that he loves only her. Here, actors stubbornly deny 
what observers can readily perceive: that their problematic deeds imply character flaws. 
Such everyday examples highlight how self-deception is not merely accidental—a 
type of cognitive error. It is also motivated—a type of wishful thinking. In particular, the 
desire to maintain a positive self-view—to self-enhance—lies at the heart of much self-
deception. To admit to a character flaw—to being, say, an addict, idler, or cad—entails a 
psychic cost, in the form of lower self-esteem or social shame. To avoid incurring that cost, 
the admission is avoided. Thus, every act of self-deception involves denial, a classic defence 
mechanism. 
Self-deceptive denials range from moderate to extreme. Suppose one pays a sizeable 
sum to see a movie, but the movie disappoints. The conclusion that one wasted money, or 
was foolish enough to do so, is unwelcome. It can, however, be avoided by concluding that 
the movie was better than it was. Such rationalizations are convenient ways of resolving 
otherwise dispiriting cognitive dissonances. More unqualified forms of denial surface in 
clinical cases of narcissism. Here, the motive to self-enhance predominates so strongly that 
arrogant self-justification becomes routine and invincible. 
 
What Mechanism Underlies Self-Deception? 
 
Can the paradox of self-deception, outlined above, be resolved? If people do not 
literally lie to themselves—by dividing themselves into two distinct and antagonistic centres 
of consciousness—how does the process work psychologically?  
One promising model draws an analogy with junk mail. Sifting through one’s mailbox, 
one attempts to separate mail one wants to keep from mail one wants to discard. To do so 
effectively, it is not always necessary to open every envelope. Superficial inspection of the 
envelope itself—is it familiar and formal, or glossy and generic?—often suffices to reliably 
identify each item.  
A similar dynamic may characterize self-deception. That is, self-deceivers may indeed 
suspect that their problematic deeds carry unflattering implications. However, they do not 
need to unpack that suspicion fully to be disturbed by it. Even “unopened”, it contains 
enough cognitive cues to signal that it is unwelcome. Accordingly, self-deceivers may opt not 
to dwell on its “contents”. The suspicion accordingly passes out of their minds, to be replaced 
by more reassuring reflections.  
Formally put, the mechanism underlying self-deception may be this: more elaborate 
processing of information is short-circuited if less elaborate processing hints that it poses a 
potential threat, especially to one’s positive view of self. Hence, there is no need to postulate 
two selves inhabiting one mind—one the deceiver, and the other the deceived. Indeed, there 
may be no need even to postulate the co-existence of two conflicting beliefs. An uncongenial 
belief may be nipped in the bud before it gets the chance to compete properly with a 
congenial one.  
This junk-mail model is consistent several findings from experimental research. For 
example, people selectively forget critical (but not flattering) feedback that pertains to 
personality characteristics that they regard as of primary (but not of secondary) importance to 
their identity.  This suggests that, on receiving the feedback that they tend to forget, people 
do not to dwell on it as much, or do not to process it as elaborately, as the less disturbing 
feedback that they tend to recall. 
 
Can Self-Deception be Experimentally Demonstrated? 
 
But let us step back for a moment. Examples of self-deception, of the sort provided 
above, are easily enumerated. However, they still involve some degree of subjective 
interpretation. Accordingly, they may be mistaken—like the farfetched diagnoses of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. The direct experimental demonstration of self-deception would therefore be 
welcome. Three classic examples are offered below. 
In one study, participants initially had their self-esteem lowered or raised by 
informing them that they had performed either poorly or well on a bogus examination. Next, 
they listened to audio recordings of varying durations. Some featured their own voice, some 
other people’s voices. Participants had to distinguish the one from the other. In addition, 
participants had their levels of physiological arousal concurrently assessed.  
Now, hearing one’s own voice normally increases arousal due to one’s implicitly 
recognizing it. This was also the case here: increased arousal reliably indicated the playing of 
one’s own voice. However, in some cases, participants mistakenly denied hearing their own 
voice when it was played, and in others, mistakenly affirmed hearing their own voice when it 
was not. Crucially, false denials were more common among participants who had had their 
self-esteem lowered, whereas false affirmations were more common among those who had 
had their self-esteem raised. This suggests that feelings of shame or pride made participants 
either reluctant or keen to identify themselves at a conscious level. Nonetheless, they still 
always identified themselves at an unconscious level. Here, participants seem to deny that 
they were experiencing particular perceptions. 
In another study, participants were led to believe that two types of heart existed: the 
Type I sort, predicting longevity, and the Type II sort, predicting the opposite. They were 
also led to believe that the length of time they could keep their forearm submerged in a bath 
of ice water—either for a longer period or a shorter one—reliably indicated which type of 
heart they had. Upon taking the relevant test, participants acted so as to modify the amount of 
time they kept their forearm submerged in the direction that implied a greater likelihood of 
possessing the desirable Type I heart.  
However, before taking the test, participants would either have possessed a Type I or 
a Type II heart. This fact would not have changed in the course of the experiment. Hence, it 
would have been pointless for participants to strive to submerge their arm for a longer or 
shorter period. That is, their performance on the test could only have been diagnostic of the 
type of heart they had, but could not have had any causal impact on it. Yet if participants 
“accidentally” found themselves keeping the hand submerged for a longer or short time, then 
they would have been free to regard the reassuring test result as real. This is exactly what 
happened. Here, participants seemed to deny that they were acting on particular intentions. 
A final study featured male participants who all claimed to be entirely heterosexual. 
They were divided into two groups: those who also reported being homophobic, and those 
who did not. Both groups watched three types of erotic movie clips: heterosexual, lesbian, 
and gay. As they watched, their penile circumference was continuously monitored with a 
plethysmograph.  
Both homophobia and non-homophobic participants showed substantial and 
equivalent arousal to heterosexual and lesbian clips. However, the homophobic participants 
also showed mild arousal to the gay clips, whereas the non-phobic participants showed next 
to none. This pattern of findings is consistent with homophobia at least partly deriving from a 
latent bisexuality deemed morally unacceptable. Here, participants seemed to deny that they 
entertained particular desires. 
 
Why Does Self-Deception Occur? 
 
Self-deception entails irrationality. People cling to positive illusions about themselves, 
in the face of contradictory evidence, and despite the practical risks of misjudging themselves. 
Why would they do so? Several hypotheses have been advanced. Some contend that self-
deception is a structural by-product of how the mind generally works. Others contend that 
self-deception is a functional adaptation facilitating survival and reproduction. Both classes 
of hypothesis are complementary rather than contradictory. 
Structurally, self-deception may arise naturally out of the modularity of the human 
mind. If somewhat autonomous mental units each perform their own specialized tasks, then 
one would not expect them always to operate in concert. This view can be readily harmonized 
with the junk-mail model above. 
Functionally, self-deception may assist the deception of others. Suppose—due to sex 
differences in reproductive biology—men generally seek to mate widely whereas women 
generally seek to mate wisely. If so, then men may evolve to deceive women about their 
fidelity, and women evolve to deceive men about their availability. As a counter-strategy, 
both sexes may then evolve to see through one other’s deception. What next? One counter-
counter-strategy would be for both sexes to deceive themselves into believing—at least at 
first—they are offering what the other sex really wants. By doing so, there would be no more 
deception to detect. Analogously, it may also be advantageous for people to deceive 
themselves about their intentions in other relationships, whether cooperative or competitive.  
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